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Meaning and Irrationality in Music
Until the second half of the 18th century meaning in music did not exist 
as a separate problem because music was simply treated as a practice 
illustrating the meanings of texts. Although at the turn of the 15th cen‑
tury purely instrumental works began to appear – that is, musical mate‑
rial gained a kind of autonomy – it was a limited autonomy, because 
they were still considered to be dependent on language.1 In other words, 
they were seen as expressive of conventional (linguistic) meanings – 
music was taken to be a rhetorical discourse, which was confirmed by 
a large number of published handbooks of such rhetorics that taught 
how to produce an intended effect of meaning by using particular 
technical devices. Therefore, music was considered to be an art of 
representation whether it be social (music serving power by means 
of representing its idealised image) or emotional (music illustrating 
feelings, as Jean ‑Jacques Rousseau wrote about it).
The problem of separate non ‑literary musical meaning appears only 
at the end of the 18th century with the so ‑called “absolute music”. Altho‑
ugh illustrating the whole problem by referring to only one figure is to 
simplify, one can say that with Ludwig van Beethoven the basic que‑
stion is no longer how to objectivise familiar feelings and emotions in 
1 Only “practical” music is being considered here. Ancient and medieval purely the‑
oretical treatises, which take musica  practica as a lower kind of practice belonging to 
a separate sphere pose a different set of problems.
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music, but how to use sounds in order to create unknown emotional 
states that only music can produce (Chanan, 38). However, with this 
understanding of the task of instrumental music as entirely autono‑
mous, its status becomes radically altered – it turns into something 
which Umberto Eco describes as “a semiotic system apparently wit‑
hout a semantic plane” (qtd. in Chanan, 28), that is, a system of signs 
which works but does not result in meaning. In other words, a riddle 
is posed: music moves us, it moves even those who know nothing 
about its “technical” (structural) content, but what does it move in us, 
if it has no “semantic plane”? When a new question appears, new the‑
ories which try to answer it spring up, yet one should perhaps remind 
oneself that most of the 19th and 20th century philosophers, including 
the greatest ones, have not had much to say about music, although 
they speculated profusely on other arts. This deafness of the thinkers 
is quite puzzling.
Two famous exceptions to this peculiar indifference are Arthur Scho‑
penhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. The former (who is said to have been 
a good flutist), in his opus magnum The World as Will and Representa‑
tion (1818, expanded edition 1844), claims that music is the highest art 
because it is the immediate expression of will unmediated by repre‑
sentation. A variation on the same subject by early Nietzsche, who still 
considers Schopenhauer as an educator and who is enthralled by Wag‑
ner, is The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music (1872) in which Apollo 
and Dionysus represent two opposing principles roughly correspon‑
ding to representation and will. A rather vulgarized continuation of this 
dualism, in the form of various pop ‑cultural versions of psychology 
and psychoanalysis, is still with us: musical material speaks or expres‑
ses our “primeval instincts,” which at the same time it “disarms” by 
means of enforcing form on them, which allows them to become subli‑
mated rather than repressed. However, in spite of the popularity of this 
take on music, an obvious problem appears here: even the most “primi‑
tive” music is always already a form of socialization and therefore its 
effect is always the establishment of at least a rudimentary social space, 
that is, it is in no way just an expression of “nature.” Therefore the idea 
that the meaning of music lies in its giving cultural expression to pre‑
 ‑cultural living “substance” without the mediation of the alienating idea 
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(as in writing) or image (as in visual arts) does not seem to be very con‑
vincing.2
In the concept of music as sublimation, form as such (and with it 
order as an effect of rationalisation) is valorised positively, so the next 
step in theorising on musical meaning is the one taken by Eduard 
Hanslick who announces that there is no extra ‑musical content in 
music: its meaning is perceptible solely as the development of its stru‑
cture, that is, it is strictly formal and has no extra ‑musical references. 
Although people often ascribe to music some extra ‑musical content, this 
is simply a popular weakness in which the sacred purity of music is 
polluted and abused by the dilettantes. However, in spite of the conti‑
nuous popularity of Hanslick’s position and certain advantages it un‑ 
doubtedly possesses (for instance, it rids us of the rather obscurantist 
idea of a “natural” foundation of music), one can have serious reserva‑
tions about it. For instance: if a composer like Claude Debussy is taken 
into consideration, one can say that in his works extra ‑musical content 
(images, atmosphere) is turned into the constructive elements of a com‑
position:
Richard Wagner’s harmony had promoted the change in the logic and 
constructive power of harmony. One of its consequences was the so ‑called 
impressionistic use of harmonies, especially practiced by Debussy. His har‑
monies without constructive meaning, often served the coloristic purpose 
of expressing moods and pictures. Moods and pictures, though extra‑
 ‑musical, thus became constructive elements, incorporated in musical 
functions; they produced a sort of emotional comprehensibility. (Scho‑
enberg, 104)
Hanslick would probably have answered to this reservation that 
Debussy’s music was French and degenerate and that his theory applied 
to the great musical forms created by Germanic classicism. However, 
2 A more sophisticated version of this theory, proposed by some psychoanalysts, may 
claim that music is a symbolic language of the unconscious whose symbolism we are 
unable to fathom. But it is absurd to speak of the existence of a symbolic language about 
which we cannot say anything. One can just as well claim that sparrows are very intel‑
ligent birds, because they have created a sophisticated symbolic logic, but unfortunately 
it is inaccessible to the human mind for unknown reasons.
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when one has a closer structural look at a classical symphony or sonata, 
one will find that they are narrative forms, and that they are narrative in 
a specific way: their narration is of a type which we also encounter in 
realist novels.
While the 18th century novel is most often simply a mixture of various 
genres in which the narration concerning adventures of the main prota‑
gonist is not necessarily the most important (the most extreme example 
of this, and a kind of parody at the same time, is Lawrence Sterne’s The 
Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman), the basic pattern of the 
realist novel, reigning supreme in the nineteenth century, focuses on 
the education in life of the protagonist (or a small group of them) who 
beginning from the original state of harmony passes through conflict 
and chaos in order to recreate the harmonious state but on the higher 
level of consciousness. In the process, the strength of his character is 
tested while he learns about himself and the world.3 Therefore, in order 
to concentrate attention on the presentation of the modern odyssey of 
the newly autonomous bourgeois individual, all discourses inessential 
to the central psychodrama, which earlier added to the colour of the 
novel, have to be discarded. The same kind of narrative structure can 
be found in the great classical forms of western music. Moreover, if one 
takes into consideration the fact that these musical forms are addres‑
sed to the ideal listener, that is, the ideal cultured bourgeois who is 
well ‑read in literature, philosophy, politics and music, one can be sure 
that he will “insert” the odyssey of the new self working out its spi‑
ritual (and economic) autonomy into the music (Chanan, 45). In other 
words, the subject identifies here with what is happening in the music 
by means of importing into the music an extra ‑musical meaning, yet 
this meaning does not appear in the guise of some external superad‑
ded content (e.g. music as expressing certain emotions) – it is the very 
form of a musical work which produces the identification. Meaning is 
not located here in the structure as such (the formal juxtaposition of 
notes is meaningless), but in what the structure itself is the expression 
3 Franco Moretti in The Way  of  the World argues quite convincingly that the rise of 
realist novel, which focuses on this particular kind of social education, can be seen as 
a reaction to the great trauma of the French Revolution.
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of: the ideal image of the dynamics of the autonomous subject as the 
“upward ‑moving” spirit in the process of self ‑overcoming, which is at 
the same time the process of self ‑realisation. In the final analysis, the 
appearance of the new 19th century subject in music can briefly be de‑
scribed thusly: the form, which without any “programmatic” content 
is already ideological in itself, brings into existence a certain kind of 
subject and its particularly structured desire – the desire to rise up to 
one’s heroic image, which appears to the subject as its most profound 
content.
Should one, therefore, treat music (and art in general) as (among 
other things) one of the disciplinary practices analysed by Foucault? 
In other words, can one rationalise music the way it is done by this 
kind of ideology critique? Even if such a critique may be inevitable and 
necessary (as in fact it is), it should be rather obvious that it constitutes 
only a preliminary stage in the understanding of the nature of musical 
meaning for the very obvious reason that the aforementioned descrip‑
tion of the coming to existence of the imaginary subject in music is the 
description of a fully successful ideological operation of identifying with 
the ideal image incarnated in a musical structure. However, one has to 
note that such an identification (together with the rationalisation which 
explains it) can never fully succeed, which results in all kinds of contra‑
dictions in the ideological form which is being described here. One can 
say, for instance, that although the epoch prefers (in music, though not 
necessarily in literature) tragic themes, the form which it uses (har‑
mony→ conflict→ higher harmony) is essentially comic (in the sense of 
being the inversion of tragedy). Therefore we return to the postulate 
that apart from form and content (whether we consider them as ideo‑
logical or not) there is something else in music, some mysterious sur‑ 
plus, something which cannot be described in rational categories. One 
of the aspects of composition which clearly points to this issue can be 
the fact that even on the strictly technical plane nobody has been able 
to rationalise music whether we take into consideration traditional har‑
monic systems or even such a hyper ‑rationalised way of composition 
as serialism. Even Pierre Boulez speaks about an irrational component 
in music:
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Let me refer to Diderot who once wrote very strikingly about how to 
approach the work of art. First, it is unknown to you, and you are in 
the dark – you just have a certain feeling for it. Second, you analyze it 
and therefore become familiar with its structure. But if you go further 
than that, you again find yourself in darkness because you did not really 
find an explanation for the irrational aspect of the work. Many people 
have analysed Mozart’s music, for instance his melodies, but nobody 
will tell you exactly why one of his melodic lines is better than that 
of any other composer of his time. You can give reasons but these rea‑
sons are always profoundly inadequate. For instance, you can judge that 
Debussy’s rhythms are terribly flexible and very interesting because of 
their flexibility; you can analyze the successions of time divisions. At the 
time, everybody was making approximately the same time divisions – 
but Debussy’s were very new and different. So you approach the work 
in the dark, you become familiar with it, and then you lose it again. You 
know, and finally, you do not know. That is encouraging, because if ana‑
lysis could lead to complete knowledge I think both of you [you and the 
composer] would soon be in despair. (Boulez, 111)
But where does the irrational come from? Are we doomed to explain it 
(but what kind of explanation is this?) by once again having recourse to 
the unconscious as the site of primeval instincts?
When one speaks about the unconscious, the automatic association 
is psychoanalysis. But is this really the case that psychoanalysis defines 
the unconscious as the site of unbridled biological forces? Certainly 
not the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan. Hence, we can perhaps use 
some Lacanian concepts in order to theoretically approach what is be‑ 
yond meaning in music. Actually, we have already loosely used his early 
theory of the mirror stage in our attempt to describe the constitution of 
the bourgeois subject in music as the narcissistic relation with the ideal 
image of oneself. The theory analyses the way in which a stable image of 
the ego is created: “falling in love” with the ideal image offered to it, the 
imperfect subject tries to rise up to the level of this image and therefore 
identifies with the values of a given society (my ideal image is an image 
which I consider lovable, but I know it is lovable because I have inter‑
nalized what is considered to be lovable by the society in which I live). 
In other words, we are dealing here with a narcissistic stage which is 
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necessary on the way to socialization because it teaches us what we 
should desire.4 However, we know that Narcissus’ story does not have 
a happy ending. That is: such identification is never completely success‑
ful – the ideal image always turns out to be a failure, it always lacks 
something impalpable, this something which actually makes me who 
I really am. And so, paradoxically, the ideal image becomes a source 
of aggression directed at everything which confirms that something is 
lacking.
In his 11th seminar Lacan revises his earlier mirror stage theory in 
order to emphasise the mechanism which makes identification impo‑
ssible. To do this, he introduces probably his most famous theoretical 
concept “object a” (Lacan 1979, 67–121). Although Lacan’s explanation is 
mainly devoted to object a as the gaze (regard) in relation to the field 
of the visible, I think that this discussion also allows one to draw cer‑
tain conclusions concerning the field of the hearable/listenable, espe‑
cially because object a is a generic name given to what psychoanalysis 
also calls “partial object,” and which can take various forms, not only of 
the gaze but also of the voice. Without going into the theoretical intrica‑
cies connected with the central place of this object in Lacanian theory, 
we can just say that it is, among other things, precisely the paradoxical 
object which is lacking in our ideal image, the lack the subject ultimately 
identifies with: I really am this something inexplicable which cannot be 
seen in any image and which makes me desirable.5 Therefore object a is 
a paradoxical object which does not exist but whose effects (the effects 
of its lack, which is taken to be the presence of something inaccessible) 
can be perceived.6
Theorising about the visible, Lacan speaks about objects which are 
traps for the eye or the gaze (Lacan 1979, 89). In a similar sense, we can 
4 In fact, the process of the formation of the ego and its desire is rather more compli‑
cated in Lacanian theory because it involves both the Imaginary (image) and the Sym‑
bolic (language). For our purposes here, however, we do not have to go into all the com‑
plications.
5 The soul has always been one of the figures of this something in me which is more 
than me.
6 Lacan calls it the object ‑cause of desire: it is rather a cause than an object because 
substantially it does not exist.
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speak about musical works as traps for the ear. Because, in the final 
analysis, the most important question we should be able to answer here 
is: why do we listen to something? As our quotation from Boulez al‑ 
ready intimated, no structural analysis will ever answer why we want to 
listen to a given work rather than to another. It is well known that there 
are plenty of pieces constructed according to the best technical rules 
whose listening is simply boring.7 Therefore, what makes the work into 
an object awakening desire? One can suggest that it is precisely object 
a as semblance (Lacan 1979, 107). In other words, representation (purely 
musical structure) has to be constructed in such a way that it becomes 
a screen which seems to veil something behind itself, something which is 
not there and which cannot be there as Hanslick argued rightly. What he 
did not realise, however, was that in the split between the hearable and 
intelligible structure and the suggestion of something that lies beyond 
it desire appeared and with it the musical subject came into existence. 
Therefore, the listening subject (and not simply the subject hearing some 
acoustic phenomena) is the effect of this impossibility of hearing the 
meaning of what one is listening to.
What we encounter here is a phenomenon (musical structure) and its 
generative principle which one cannot find “in the notes,” but whose 
effect the musical structure is. The origin, the source of musical form is 
therefore informe: the unformed (what does not have meaning in music) 
and the inquiry (the question addressed to the representation about 
what it is the representation of) (Copjec, 35). In other words, the effect 
cannot appear without its generative principle, yet the generative prin‑
ciple does not have an autonomous existence which can but does not 
have to produce its effect (like, for instance, the state of “inspiration”) 
– the generative principle is simply the empty place in the structure 
which the effect indicates (Copjec, 9). It is not only that meaning has 
belonged to the “essence” of music for most of its history, but that, para‑
doxically, it presents itself even in its own absence in absolute music. 
The absence which appears here takes the form of a lack. The point is 
not that something is not there – if something we do not know is not 
7 Moreover, if we accept music as entirely autonomous, that is, limited to its structure, 
we make it into something resembling chess.
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there, we do not know that it is not there; absence appears to us only 
as something lacking. For a man used to sound film, sound in a silent 
film is not simply absent, but even more present (its lack is the source 
of discomfort) by its very absence. We know, however, what is lacking 
in a silent film, while object a remains elusive. Yet, its elusiveness is 
not one of the impossible ideal which is determinate but unreachable 
(for instance, because as transcendent and spiritual it cannot be realised 
in the fallen material and materialist existence) but of the impossible 
(non ‑existent) Real which by producing desire disfigures the stable and 
familiar reality in which we live.
The consequences of the aforementioned characteristics are far‑
 ‑reaching: one can say that absorbing music (as any successful work of 
art) is inhuman. Music seems to turn its back on us in order to face its 
meaning which is for us inaccessible. In other words, it seems to enjoy 
itself in the way which is completely independent of us. We approach 
it and feel guilty because we do not understand. In our encounter with 
autonomous art it turns out that its function is to make us aware that we 
lack something and that in order to understand we have to overcome 
our miserable and limited self, that is, we have to become someone else. 
If we have to look for heroism in art, this is the place to find it.
There is one more consequence deserving mention: it is semiotics 
and not acoustics which sheds a proper kind of light on the problem 
of music. Because only the signifier can give things meaning, it is the 
signifier which makes listening possible (Copjec, 34).8 Therefore, there 
is no listening independent of language and meaning – music is audio‑
 ‑graphy. But it is “audiographic” primarily in the formal sense discus‑
sed above and not because people tend to impose all kinds of extra‑
 ‑musical scenarios on it. One has to add, however, that such scenarios 
are probably inevitable and they are precisely the outcome of music’s 
“audiographism.” Because music becomes the veil behind which object 
a is hidden, all kinds of private and social fantasies, which attempt to 
assimilate the inhuman in music and force it to become the expression 
of ourselves, are projected on such a screen. The screen then turns into 
Narcissus’ mirror.
8 Copjec argues a parallel point relating the signifier to the field of the visible.
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